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Shaping Entrepreneurial Subjects: How Structural Changes and Institutional 
Fixes Shape Financial Strategies in Daily Life 
 
Abstract 
The notion of a ‘financial subjectivity’ is fast becoming an important way of 
understanding how people rationalize the need to take risks in daily life as crucial to 
personal success. This paper therefore traces the structural changes and institutional 
fixes – that is, the institutional stabilisation of crisis tendencies in capitalism – to 
understand how individual strategies for making ends meet have been shaped by 
finance. In particular, I look at Regulation theory’s depictions of the ‘ideology of 
shareholder value’ as partially responsible for the flourishing business sector in 
which competition and the threat of takeover led to the prioritsation of corporate 
performance over job security and workers’ benefits. However, it is also necessary 
to understand the particular mechanisms that enable independence from the welfare 
state at the level of the household, in the form of expanded borrowing and financial 
services, which I explore further in this paper. 
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Introduction 
The late 1970s mark a period in the United Kingdom in which discourses began to 
shift from the politics of the Keynesian national welfare state, to the need for 
privatisation, market liberalisation and greater individual freedom and 
responsibility. This set the tone for a period of flourishing finance, alongside the 
global deregulation of markets, with the United Kingdom becoming a major centre 
of finance: as growth in productive industries fell, accumulation was increasingly 
recorded in the financial sector (Lapavitsas, 2009b; 2013). The financialised growth 
regime, characterised by ‘giant mergers, capital mobility between countries, 
pressures on corporate governance, [and] diffusion of equity among a larger 
fraction of population’ (Boyer, 2000: 116), represents a new period of capitalist 
development, where finance predominates. As Lapavitsas (2011; 2013) points out, 
however, structural changes in markets and institutions also occur alongside the 
financialisation of workers’ wages and household finances, so that the emergence of 
financialisation is characterised as much by the integration of UK households into 
financial markets as it is by the expansion of financial trading among firms and the 
provision of financial services by banks. Consequently, it is important to 
understand the ways in which finance-led growth and its institutional fixes cultivate 
entrepreneurial subjectivity among people. 
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 Financial subjectivity is the constitution of self-reliant subjects, who 
internalise entrepreneurial attitudes toward risk-taking that may earn rewards in 
financial markets as the most efficient way of managing household money and 
measuring personal success (Langley, 2008a; Mulcahy, forthcoming). Individuals 
have become less risk-averse as wages are increasingly integrated into financial 
markets, through a reliance on pensions and personal investment, as well as 
through credit and borrowing. This paper thus situates the emergence of financial 
subjects within changes at the level of the market in the United Kingdom, which 
include the integration of household revenue into finance markets as a result of the 
restructuring of banks, and a growing business sector fostered by market 
liberalisation. This configuration of institutions contributes to the rationalisation of 
risk and financial sensibilities in everyday choices and decisions. I therefore focus 
on the causal mechanisms that give rise to financial subjectivity. The study of 
financialisation as a period of growth and development provides crucial insight into 
the material mechanisms of subjectivation, since a ‘key feature’ of the periodisation 
of capitalism is its ‘concern with the strategic possibilities any given period provides 
for different actors, different identities, different interests, different coalition 
possibilities, different horizons of action, different strategies, different tactics’ 
(Jessop, 2001: 285 – 86). Consequently, the ‘transfer of risk’ from employers (Cutler 
and Waine, 2001: 105) to the workforce (Amoore, 2004) and households (Langley, 
	  
4 
2008a) through private pensions and the need for personal investment over 
occupational welfare; or the ‘democratisation’ of credit and the integration of many 
households into credit markets as borrowers, promote entrepreneurial strategies 
among working individuals for looking after themselves and their futures. Taking 
risks to earn rewards in everyday life is therefore not only encouraged as a form of 
individual self-improvement, but is inscribed within the structural framework in 
which subjects work and live. 
 
Explaining financial subjectivity: Changing structures and strategies 
Financial subjectivity is a set of practices undertaken in daily life that reorient the 
relationship of individuals and their households to the notion of risk as necessary to 
success. Self-sufficiency is also seen as crucial to achieving goals, rather than relying 
on the provisions of a welfare state. The period during the 1970s, both in the United 
Kingdom and abroad, provides a useful marker of change in accumulation 
strategies and subjective sensibilities, with the decline of the Keynesian national 
welfare state triggered by stagnating or decreasing profits in production and 
tensions between unions and employers. The Conservative government under 
Thatcher notoriously framed the problems plaguing the British economy in terms of 
industry held hostage by trade unions and government regulations, so that the 
privatisation of national industries and the deregulation of markets became a 
	  
5 
crucial way of encouraging innovation and investment. Market liberalisation 
subsequently led to a flourishing financial sector in London, which did not entirely 
resolve the issues in the productive, or ‘real’ sectors (Jessop, Bonnet and Bromley, 
1990), but instead inaugurated the beginning of a new, ‘financialised’ growth 
regime in the United Kingdom.  
The emergence of a structure of financial accumulation can, following 
Lapavitsas, be traced to changes in trading and financial activities on the part of 
non-financial corporations, in addition to the concurrent restructuring of banks, 
which help to facilitate the financialisation of household wages and income: ‘non-
financial enterprises have become increasingly involved in financial processes on an 
independent basis, often undertaking financial market transactions on their own 
account’. They ‘have become relatively more remote from banks’, which have 
‘turned toward individual and household income as a source of profit’, rendering 
individuals more reliant ‘on the formal financial system to facilitate access to vital 
goods and services’ (2013: 794). In short, a newly liberalised, competitive business 
sector means that firms are progressively developing their own capacities in trading, 
leading banks to develop a wider range of financial services and products outside 
the commercial realm and targeted at households. The following section looks at 
the increasing financialisation of firms and the rise of market-based finance in work 
done by the regulation school and their studies of the emergence of a new, finance-
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led growth regime, before focusing in later sections on the integration of individuals 
and households into finance markets.  
  I argue for the necessity of returning to the analysis of how structures and 
institutions subjectivate (Foucault, 1988; 1994) individuals, or subject them to 
social norms and conventions of stratification while they internalise and freely act 
on the practices of entrepreneurialism associated with financial liberalisation 
(Althusser, 1971). The creation of subjects is a crucial complement to the 
regulationists’ adherence to the notion of a ‘process without a subject’ (Nadel, 2005: 
31), originally advanced by Althusser (1972; 1976) to explain the progression of 
history in the absence of an essentialised subject. In place of individuals as 
teleological drivers of history, Althusser emphasises the role of class struggle in 
Marx as ‘the motor of history’ (1976: 51), precisely because ‘society is not 
composed of individuals’, but of ‘social relations in which its individuals live, work 
and struggle’ (Marx, cited in Althusser, 1976: 53). The nature of individuals is 
therefore specific to the conditions in which they live, and the kinds of limitations 
or difficulties they face are derived from contradictions and inequality produced by 
broader structures and institutions of a growth regime.  
It is important to understand how these conditions disproportionately affect 
individuals and households in the transfer of risk. In spite of discourse on risk-
taking and entrepreneurialism in recent decades as solutions to everything from 
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corporate takeovers to planning for retirement, the regularising effects of the 
institutional fixes of finance-led growth are still class-based, since workers are 
encouraged to become self-sufficient through the acquisition of debt as a 
supplement to wages; they do not have substantial control over any wealth itself, 
with worker ‘ownership’ referring primarily to any indirect ownership of equities a 
small number of workers incur through unit trusts or pensions (cf. Martin, 2002). In 
the next section, then, I trace the development of the financialised subject through 
institutional changes beyond the rise of shareholder value.  
 
Hilferding’s approach to finance, and the class-based stratification of subjects 
in order to understand how working individuals and households can internalise the 
necessity of taking risks in everyday life, it is important to illustrate how the 
reorganisation of financial markets and institutions actually renders financial risk 
accessible to people as a feasible path to potential reward. I turn to Lapavitsas’ 
work on the permeating effects of financialisation, to parse out the implications of 
financial liberalisation on everyday life. Returning to the earlier systematic 
development of finance in the Marxist tradition, Lapavitsas follows Hilferding by 
asserting that the ‘roots’ of financialisation as a ‘structural transformation of 
advanced capitalist economies’ are found in the expansion of financial activity 
across financial and non-financial enterprises, rather than focusing on ‘the escape of 
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capital to the realm of finance’ and away from production (Lapavitsas, 2013: 798; 
Lapavitsas, 2011). However, in contrast to Hilferding, who holds that corporations 
become financialised the more they rely on banks for investment (1981), Lapavitsas 
suggests that the modern firm has ‘been able to finance investment without relying 
heavily on banks. The primary mechanism has been retention of own profits’, with 
external finance derived from trading in markets at a lower cost (2011: 620). As 
firms developed their own financial capacities, banks have also restructured 
themselves by ‘mediating in open markets to earn fees, commissions and profits 
from trading’, as well as those to be earned in lending to individuals and 
households, or ‘handling savings and financial assets’ (2013: 800). The result is the 
integration of wages and incomes into finance markets, as households begin to 
invest their savings in insurance, pensions, or unit trusts, while obtaining credit and 
loans with which to make purchases.  
 The major benefit to this approach is the ability to examine the 
subjectivation of middle and working classes under financialisation as a necessary 
component to the emergence, maintenance, and reproduction of a finance-led 
growth regime, rather than studying decreasing working conditions, such as job 
insecurity and lower pay, as mere consequences of the domination of the ideology 
of shareholder value and indicators of household struggles. To be sure, stagnant or 
declining wages and a climate of insecurity likely contribute to the reliance on 
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credit by households at given times as they attempt to make ends meet. However, 
an explanation of how working individuals internalise the objectives of 
entrepreneurialism and self-sufficiency requires the elaboration of the 
financialisation of everyday life as a result of financial deregulation within markets 
and restructuring at the level of banks. What will become apparent is that, 
individual subjectivation at the level of the household is not simply an offshoot of 
the financialisation of managerial classes through efficiency and competition, but is 
instead predicated on a sense of independence from the welfare state, rendering it a 
related, but crucial aspect of financialisation itself.  
 
The ascendance of finance 
The account provided by Lapavitsas (2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2013) is particularly 
compelling in its outline of the global emergence of finance as historically and 
institutionally mediated, so that any general tendencies that might be shared at an 
international level refer to the extent to which the logic of finance has permeated 
non-financial institutions, rather than to the rates at which profit has declined 
across individual national economies. The development of the business sector out 
of the drive to maximise share prices has led to a climate of takeovers, but it also 
enables the growth of corporate skills in financial trading, as corporations are 
increasingly involved in stock markets (Lapavitsas, 2013). As a result, 
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Large multinational corporations are typically able to finance the bulk of 
their investment without relying heavily on banks and mostly by drawing on 
retained profits. In so far as they require external finance, they are able to 
obtain significant volumes in open financial markets, relatively 
independently of banks. Even the wage bill of large non-financial 
corporations is frequently financed through the issuing of commercial paper 
in open markets (ibid., 799 – 800).  
 
The consequence of this, for employees, has been the spread of the logic of finance 
across operations in the workforce which were previously non-financial, which 
introduces a level of instability associated with finance market fluctuation into the 
lives of working individuals.  
On one hand, there appears to be indifference on the part of finance to 
stagnant or declining wages, and employees’ reduced purchasing power (Duménil 
and Lévy, 2011) in the pursuit of shareholder value at the level of corporate 
management. This engenders the deterioration of labour conditions for some of the 
workforce and the attenuation of employee benefits at work such as, in the United 
Kingdom, collective insurance and occupational welfare encompassing pensions 
and insurance, or the provision of healthcare, childcare, housing or education 
(Cutler and Waine, 2001; Langley, 2008a). However, the decline of occupational 
	  
11 
welfare in the United Kingdom and its replacement with private occupational 
pensions reflects what Cutler and Waine describe as the ‘transfer of risk to the 
workforce’ in the ‘pursuit of shareholder value’ (2001: 105), which, as much as 
anything else, shifts the dependence of the households from the volatility of job 
markets to that of finance markets: while occupational welfare was previously 
viewed as providing insufficient coverage to workers, who were ‘vulnerable to 
changes in levels and patterns of employment’ (Cutler and Waine, 2001: 97; Pfaller, 
1991), workers are now dependent on the fluctuations of equity markets, as well as 
relying on stable employment prospects. Occupational welfare, which encompassed 
flat rate state pensions, was grounded in ‘the employer’s guarantee that, on 
retirement, the scheme member would receive a proportion of earnings with 
entitlements determined by the accrual rate […], the salary level, and the length of 
service with the company’ (Cutler and Waine, 104), while private occupational 
pensions with defined contributions ‘involve an obligation on the employer to make 
only a definite contribution to an employee’s pension plan. In defined contribution 
schemes the pension is determined by the contributions made and the investment 
performance of the plan concerned’ (ibid., 107). Where occupational welfare was 
premised on the ‘social right to retirement income’ in which ‘society as a whole has 
a liability towards the holder of such a claim’ (Aglietta, 2000: 157), private pension 
plans underscore the ‘ageing society’ and the ‘pensions crisis’ facing the UK 
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(Langley, 2008a) as a result of the slowdown in growth relative to, during the 
1970s, escalating wages and the subsequent increase in state scheme liabilities 
(Cutler and Waine, 2001).  
The encouragement of private pensions dependent on the performance of a 
pension fund is thus, as Langley (2008a) has it, a question of ‘disciplinary 
disincentives that discourage the reliance upon state insurance’, evidenced by the 
Thatcher government’s indexation of basic state pension benefits to prices aimed at 
eroding pensioners’ incomes (cf. Blackburn, 2002). It is, then, possible to categorise 
a shift in attitudes about the provision for future retirement from an obligation 
collectively borne by society for staving off potential future risks, to an 
individualised concern for generating an income in the ‘popular capitalism’ and 
‘individual ownership’ promoted by the Conservative Party during its reform of 
pension policy in 1985 (Waine, 1995). As financial subjects, success partially 
depends on the competent navigation of finance markets in the act of personal 
investment, insomuch as people are required to take risks as ‘individual owners’ of 
equity capital. Framed relative to wages and employment, ‘individual ownership’ 
retains a distinctly class character, since the growth of pension funds has resulted in 
the concentration of wealth among their managers and corporate CEOs, rather than 
working individuals and households. Indeed, at the other end of the spectrum 
among households characterised by low weekly earnings and few or no 
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qualifications (ONS, 2014b), 24 percent of UK households hold no wealth in 
private pensions at all (ONS, 2014c). For those who do have pensions, stagnating 
wages and the rising cost of bills and utility fees, in addition to childcare and 
housing costs, make it difficult for lower income households to actively contribute 
to pensions and save for retirement from a young age (Cumbo, 2015). The benefits 
gained from personal investment in private pensions are therefore primarily enjoyed 
by the upper and middle classes rather than the working class. Additional ‘financial 
disengagement’ on the part of low-income working households means that few 
households have investment products or savings accounts, and have little 
understanding of economic and financial indicators (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
2015) so that their engagement with finance markets is largely through the use of 
credit and the acquisition of debt.  
 The construction of financial illiteracy and minimal or no investments as 
social problems plaguing older, lower income households in planning for their 
futures (ibid.) indicates the extent to which the welfare state has ceded to 
financialisation by illustrating the kinds of options and choices subjects have 
planning and structuring their livelihoods. Thus, as private pensions eclipse 
occupational welfare and the provision for one’s future becomes a private 
responsibility rather than a social right, personal investment in unit trusts and 
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portfolios with greater returns than interest accrued through savings accounts 
becomes an important fixture in planning for retirement or supplementing income.  
 Owing to the effects that corporate restructuring has on the workforce itself, 
and in creating a space for the need and provision of new personal financial 
services, it is also necessary to take Lapavitsas’ concern with the reorganisation of 
banks into account. The restructuring of banks is, in part, related to ‘the enormous 
growth of open financial markets in recent decades’, so that in response to ‘the 
altered conduct of non-financial enterprises’ they have ‘moved toward mediating in 
open markets to earn fees, commissions and profits from trading’ (ibid., 2013: 800). 
Crucial in the development of financial subjectivity is the way banks have also 
‘turned toward individuals (and households in general) to obtain profits from 
lending but also from handling savings and financial assets’ (ibid.), meaning that 
household income and wages become a source of profit (ibid., 2011). There is a 
change in the kinds of services provided by banks, and the way in which they are 
handled, stemming largely from the re-regulation of the financial system in the 
United Kingdom during the year 1986, in which the Financial Services Act and the 
Building Societies Act dissolved institutional divides and encouraged competition 
among financial enterprises (Leyshon and Pollard, 2000; Wainwright, 2012).  
 Leyshon and Pollard (2000) conclude that there has been a regulatory 
convergence in the provision of financial services between American and British 
	  
15 
banks, as ‘a traditional and largely informal system of regulation was swept away 
[in Britain] and replaced with a more codified US-style system of statutory 
regulation’ (2000: 208). As a result, retail banking in the United Kingdom has 
undergone a process of centralisation, designed to concentrate operations and 
provide services, more efficiently, to a larger population. While bank branches 
previously served as sources of information about their local customers, as well as 
the site for the provision of services, retail banking now focuses on the generation of 
fees by offering services to large, diverse populations, which are better understood 
through databases and rating techniques (Langley, 2008a; 2008b), than in face-to-
face interaction (Leyshon and Pollard, 2000). The upshot is that branches now 
focus primarily on the generation of income through fees, by providing a range of 
personal investment products.  
 The rise in technologies of personal investment, and with it the 
financialisation of household income made possible by re-regulation, has 
additionally been accompanied by increased borrowing, as the Financial Services 
and Building Societies Acts opened British markets to restructuring at the level of 
investment banks. Prominent in this respect was the arrival of the process of 
securitisation to the United Kingdom in 1986, which was re-engineered from its 
American origins to channel international capital into the United Kingdom 
(Wainwright, 2009). Securitisation is ‘the process of “bundling” together a stream 
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of future obligations arising from mortgage repayments to provide the basis for the 
issue of, and payment of principle and interest on securities’ (Langley, 2006: 283). 
This can include asset-backed securities, or the ‘repayments arising from everyday 
borrowing’ (Langley, 2008b: 136) for ‘credit cards, consumer loans, car finance and 
infrastructure’ (Wainwright, 2009: 374), as well as mortgage-backed securities in 
which residential mortgages are bundled together (Langley, 2006; 2008b; 
Wainwright, 2009).  
 At the level of financial markets, the introduction of securitisation within the 
United Kingdom hinges on the re-regulation of financial markets to promote 
competition among enterprises, making them more compatible with American 
securitisation. According to Wainwright, the passing of the Financial Services Act 
‘opened the markets to a myriad of new financial institutions such as banks and 
centralized lenders, while the Building Societies Act (1986) allowed building 
societies to demutualize and become banks’ (2009: 377; cf. 2012). Consequently, 
American investment banks established lending subsidiaries in the United 
Kingdom, while retail banks began to originate loans and mortgages (ibid.) as new 
financial products. For banks and lenders, securitisation represents ‘a cheap way of 
borrowing, since a company or lender can realize its income streams early’, while 
some ‘lenders also benefit from the off-balance sheet nature of securitization, which 
has led some banks to originate profitable, high-risk mortgages as the credit risk is 
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shifted from their balance sheets to investors’ (Wainwright, 2009: 374; cf. Leyshon 
and Thrift, 2007; Dymski, 2007). For borrowers, securitisation enabled the 
incorporation of larger populations, including riskier households, into financial 
markets. By providing structured finance services, investment banks could 
concentrate the risk of default into tranches or fractions of capital in order to isolate 
credit risk as a smaller proportion of securitised notes available to investors looking 
for higher returns by taking on more risk (Wainwright, 2009).  
The result, as I have indicated in the earlier discussion of the 
democratisation of finance and credit, has been the expansion of services available 
even to higher risk individuals and households, which constitutes the main form of 
participation in financial activities for many working class households. For Pettifor 
(2006), the liberalisation of finance responsible for opening finance markets, 
removing caps on interest and the amount of credit advanced by financial 
institutions, is the root of the easy availability of money that has led to middle class 
indebtedness and low-income households borrowing beyond their means. The 
expansion of credit even to high-risk households therefore exacerbates a 
longstanding history between poverty and indebtedness, given the strong 
relationship ‘between indebtedness and low relative income’ (Parker, 1990: 201), by 
rendering credit a necessity in making ends meet and easy to obtain.  
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In sum, then, the conditions that give rise to the need to think about finance 
at the level of everyday household finances include the transfer of risk from 
employers to employees in the workforce, as a result of corporate restructuring in a 
financially liberal climate; as well as the concurrent restructuring of retail and 
investment banking which provided more scope for household investment and 
borrowing. These changes, overall, are indicative of a larger shift from provision for 
individuals and households through the Keynesian national welfare state, to 
financialised economies that are entwined with each other on a global scale, each 
with particular localised structures and institutions (Wainwright, 2012). Working-
class households, in addition to the managerial classes which are forced to adapt to 
market competition, are increasingly subject to the fluctuations of finance markets 
in the course of adapting their circumstances to their conditions. It is commonplace 
in the literature on ‘new’ economies of ‘late’ and ‘postmodernity’ (e.g., Bauman, 
2001; Giddens, 1991), ‘postindustrial’, ‘information’ societies (e.g., Bell, 1973; Lash 
and Urry, 1994), or neoliberalism (e.g. Harvey, 2005) to suggest that families, 
households and groups are increasingly individualised within contemporary 
capitalism, as a result of the declining welfare state and economic deregulation. 
However, since the process of subjectivation is, by definition, one of 
individualisation (Althusser, 1971; Foucault, 1994), it is necessary to specify the 
mechanisms through which the ‘individual’ is constituted: what requires emphasis 
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is the way the process of financialisation individualises people, as entrepreneurial 
risk-takers who learn to view finance markets as a means of subsistence and 
success. This stands in contrast with the subject which had previously been 
individualised through the expression of affluence as a product of hard work, in an 
era of mass production and mass consumption. 
 Indeed, this is a particular type of individualisation relative to the emerging 
prominence of finance markets within the workforce, through the financialisation 
of firms and management, and within daily life, in the withdrawal of welfare state 
provision and the rise of investment and borrowing in its place. It is a different form 
of individualisation than that promoted during Fordist mass production and 
consumption of the post-war years, when regulated wages and benefits sought 
through institutionalised collective bargaining solidified a certain level of stability 
for the working class; this enabled them to become consumers and, importantly, 
homeowners, who could live further away from work and cultivate comfortable 
lifestyles suited to their unique tastes, outside of their roles as wage-earning workers 
(Jessop, 2013; Wolff, 2005). In this respect, individualisation previously concerned 
the expression of success in the present in consumption, while financial subjects are 
individualised in the level of responsibility they are expected to take for their future 
success.  
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 Indeed, as Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim have it, ‘individuals 
must be able to plan for the long term and adapt to change; they must organize and 
improvise, set goals, recognize obstacles, accept defeats and attempt new starts. 
They need initiative, tenacity, flexibility and tolerance of frustration’ (2002: 4). This 
is because, in contemporary Western societies, it is necessary to eke out a place and 
a use for oneself, as traditional social restrictions and limitations are lifted in favour 
of ‘incentives to action’: ‘One has to win, to know how to assert oneself in the 
competition for limited resources – and not only once, but day after day’ (ibid., 3). 
Consequently, the ‘normal biography thus becomes the “elective biography”, the 
“reflexive biography”, the “do-it-yourself biography”. This does not necessarily 
happen by choice, neither does it always succeed. The do-it-yourself biography is 
always a “risk biography” […] a state of permanent (partly overt, partly concealed) 
endangerment’ (ibid.; cf. Beck, 1992). Zygmunt Bauman therefore holds that 
‘everything seems to conspire against […] lifelong projects, permanent bonds, 
eternal alliances, immutable identities. I cannot build for the long term on my job, 
my profession, or even my abilities’ (cited in Beck et al., 2002: 4). But it is not only 
the labour market that complicates things for individuals, inasmuch as they ‘may be 
more than ever before dependent on the play of market forces which s/he comes 
nowhere near being aware of, let alone understanding or anticipating, but s/he will 
have to pay for her/ his decisions individually, taken or not taken’ (Bauman, 
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2001b: 11; cf. Bauman, 2000). Financialisation, additionally, renders livelihoods 
susceptible to risk and change, as individuals and families bank on possessions as 
forms of investment that turn over, rather than as status markers of a comfortable, 
stable lifestyle. 
While mass consumption is still a major driver of the economy, it is not 
always undertaken as an expression of household and economic wealth, so much as 
it is linked with indebtedness and the need for future repayment. Exemplary of this 
shift is, as Langley notes, the way in which homeownership has become an asset for 
the future, rather than a status symbol of current earnings: ‘future autonomy and 
welfare for owner-occupiers and would-be owner-occupiers increasingly appears to 
turn less on the home as an individual space of shelter and refuge, and more on the 
financial returns achieved from house price rises. In short, liberal suburban subjects 
are now explicitly neo-liberal property investors’ (2006: 290). Martin even considers 
that securitisation has functioned as a new form of dispossession for the working 
class, since ‘[p]ossession has been rendered liquid so that it can be revalued daily. 
The active pulse of money in motion is the medium through which occasions arise 
to move physically from place to place as a job or home can no longer bear the 
demand for increased value placed upon it. Expanded capacity for risk tolerance is 
crucial to […] the willingness to dispossess oneself in order to recombine with 
greater return elsewhere’ (2002: 141 – 42). Financialisation therefore combines with 
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the precarious labour market to render contemporary subjects individualised on the 
basis of their ability or inability to cope with the fluctuation of financial and labour 
markets, which provide opportunities for some, and disadvantages for others. 
Hence, for Bauman, the idea of individualisation elucidates ‘the emancipation of 
the individual from his or her ascribed, inherited and inborn determination of social 
character’ (2001c: 124), so that individuals must create their own biographies rather 
than relying on pre-existing social structures to create an identity for them. As my 
own work has shown, additionally, this sense of identity turns on one’s ability to 
handle and manage risk, and indeed internalise it as necessary to realising goals and 
aspirations. Thus, the combination of structures and institutions of any given period 
of accumulation is crucial to the understanding of the formation of subjectivity, as a 
range of knowledge about groups and individuals and actions that they can 
reasonably take within the context of their surroundings.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have examined the emergence of finance-led growth in the United 
Kingdom as a means of understanding the advent of a financialised subject, for 
whom risk and precariousness are features of everyday life. As Beck (1992), Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim (2002), and Bauman (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) all similarly 
conclude, the traditional structures of society have given way to individualised 
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regulations, rules, and codes of practice, which require subjects to take on a 
newfound responsibility for their lives. I have therefore followed the work of Costas 
Lapavitsas to understand the effects that market liberalisation had on the 
restructuring of investment and retail banks, in order to understand how the 
reorganisation of firms and banks gave rise to the financialisation of household 
income, in the prevalence of personal investment and borrowing to account for 
declining welfare state provision in the United Kingdom. My contention is that this 
process has produced individualised subjects, although they are still oriented by 
their relation to employment and wages. Financialised subjects of the working class 
are not those whose entrepreneurialism results in control of value on the markets, 
but those who have internalised the mechanisms of risk from finance markets as 
most conducive to personal success and management of household finances. This 
means that risk taking in the course of personal investment is conditioned by the 
rise to prominence of financial institutions: the need to take risks is structurally 
inscribed within the arrangement of such institutions as a result of declining welfare 
provisions and market liberalisation, so that risk as a precursor to reward seems, in 
itself, a rational formula for making ends meet. 
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